"An Army at Dawn," by Rick Atkinson, is a gripping saga of the seldom-discussed great drama that unfolded in North Africa in 1942 and 1943. That first year of the Allied war was a pivotal point in American history, the moment when the United States began to act like a great power.
Beginning with the daring amphibious invasion in November 1942, "An Army at Dawn" follows the American and British armies as they fight the French in Morocco and Algeria, and then take on the Germans and Italians in Tunisia. Battle by battle, an inexperienced and sometimes poorly led army gradually becomes a superb fighting force.
Central to the tale are the extraordinary but fallible commanders who come to dominate the battlefield: Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley, Montgomery, and Rommel. This book is brilliantly researched, rich with new material and startling insights. Atkinson's vivid narrative provides the definitive history of the war in North Africa.
"An Army At Dawn" addresses a very important phase of World War II, which has been much overlooked in the past decade of WWII literature. This is an outstanding new history, in which the U.S. Army began with costly errors before forging itself into a superb fighting force.
Author Rick Atkinson, a Pulitzer Prize winner (The Long Gray Line and Crusade) created An Army at Dawn as the first volume of a new trilogy on WWII. If Volumes 2 and 3 are half as good, historians will long be indebted to him. "An Army At Dawn" provides a frame of reference, without which any reader's understanding of the latter phases of World War II in Europe will be incomplete.
Impressive research and a panoramic overview of the total campaign result in a vivid and lively narrative with fresh insights and conclusions. Montgomery's British troops were already tested and battle-hardened when the Americans executed the landings for Operation Torch in November 1942.
Montgomery was rolling Rommel's German and Italian armies back from the east, and the plan was for the Allied American-British-French Army Groups to squeeze the Axis with an eastward march from Algeria to Tunis. In their pullback, the Germans were exacting a bloody toll on the newly landed Allied troops.
The book presents Allied commanders at their best and worst. Dwight Eisenhower was the Supreme Allied Commander but had not yet won British confidence. Even among themselves, American commanders traded verbal punches, and sometimes with justification. Many American troops were poorly trained and prepared for this war. The officer corps included many ossified and politicized veterans who were slow to recognize a need for new tactics. Much American battle equipment was outdated and ineffective against German panzers and artillery. A terrible price of 6,000 American lives was paid for these mistakes.
The February 1943 Battle for Kasserine Pass in Tunisia is painted as the Army's most humiliating defeat, and it accounted for most of the Americans lost in North Africa. The author describes a wild scramble in retreating from a Nazi force that could have been stopped with proper preparation and leadership.
Major fault for the Army's poor performance is focused not only on U.S. II Corps Commander Major General Lloyd Fredendall, but also on General Dwight Eisenhower, who had specially chosen Fredendall but failed to remove him when early indications of Fredendall's shortcomings appeared. After the Kasserine disaster, Eisenhower learned from his mistakes and went on to become a great commander. Atkinson also highlights the political problems that Ike had to overcome.
While there is much information about U.S. Army operations (including the 1st Armored Division and 34th Infantry Division) U.S. Navy readers will appreciate the account of Vice Admiral Kent Hewitt's Task Force 34 that secretly conveyed the American Army to North Africa. Sailing from Hampton Roads, Hewitt led more than 100 ships carrying 33,843 soldiers to an unfamiliar beachhead more than 4,500 miles away - an accomplishment of immense skill and difficulty, especially since the U.S. Navy lacked experience of this magnitude.
Overall, the operation was well executed, despite a lack of various types of landing craft that were only then coming into full production. The Navy brought the soldiers, tanks, and artillery required for the invasion, and it also conveyed many of the U.S. Army Air Force units that would be needed. The carrier Ranger had been deck-loaded with Curtiss P-40 Warhawks, which were flown from her deck when the planes were within range of Algeria.
At Oran, American and British warships exchanged fire with French ships. French Naval commanders ignored a plea to strike their Axis/Vichy colors, and the French North African Fleet had to be destroyed.
In mid-1943, the Allied Commander's Conference at Casablanca was conducted. The book details deceptions required for removing President Roosevelt from Washington, D.C., during a time of war, with no one aware of his absence for more than a week.
At the conference, the strategy for the defeat of Germany was hotly debated regarding priorities: a Channel Invasion first, or attacking the "soft underbelly" of Europe. Private conversations between Roosevelt and Churchill were poignant and illustrative of both the trusts and the reservations each held about the other. The chapter on Casablanca is a highlight of the book.
As the Allies pushed the Nazis backward toward Tunis, the British Army squeezed the Germans from the south and east. Despite a victory now in sight (or perhaps because of it), the American and British commanders continued to butt heads and trade insults.
The difference now, however, was the Americans were already showing they had learned from their earlier mistakes and were on a par with any other Allied army in besting the enemy.
America's industrial production might is also emphasized as a vital component of the war. If North Africa was the dawn, the American fighting machine had become wide-awake, and was now charging forward.
Robert Kuchem is a retired captain in the U.S. Navy Reserve.
